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Abstract
We provide a methodology, resilient feature engineering,
for creating adversarially resilient classifiers. According
to existing work, adversarial attacks identify weakly cor-
related or non-predictive features learned by the classifier
during training and design the adversarial noise to uti-
lize these features. Therefore, highly predictive features
should be used first during classification in order to de-
termine the set of possible output labels. Our methodol-
ogy focuses the problem of designing resilient classifiers
into a problem of designing resilient feature extractors
for these highly predictive features. We provide two the-
orems, which support our methodology. The Serial Com-
position Resilience and Parallel Composition Resilience
theorems show that the output of adversarially resilient
feature extractors can be combined to create an equally
resilient classifier. Based on our theoretical results, we
outline the design of an adversarially resilient classifier.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks and other machine learning algo-
rithms have seen large success being used in industry for
numerous tasks. However, the rise in interest towards
these algorithms has also raised concerns in the commu-
nity as to their trustworthiness. Namely, these algorithms
are vulnerable to adversarial inputs. These are inputs
that, to a human, appear no different from an existing
input the algorithm can correctly label, but are slightly
modified such that the algorithm assigns a different label
to them. These types of inputs can harm the widespread
adoption of machine learning algorithms, especially in
safety critical tasks. For example, in autonomous driv-
ing, machine learning is used to perform object recogni-
tion, thus it is critical that the algorithm is robust to such
adversarial inputs.
Previous research in adversarial machine learning lim-
ited attacks to the digital domain. Adversarial modifica-
tions would be directly applied to the input of the algo-
rithm (e.g., an image file). Recent work, however, has
demonstrated that it is possible to craft adversarial inputs
in the physical domain [7, 9]. Thus, it is critically im-
portant to design defensive measures that can reduce or
remove the risk of adversarial examples. In the digital
domain, many defensive solutions have been proposed,
but most strategies are limited. As pointed out by previ-
ous work, most defensive solutions only work on a static
adversary or under very specific conditions [1, 2, 4, 5].
Current literature identifies that adversarial examples
are possible due to machine learning models relying on
features which are weakly correlated with the correct
output label [24] or assigning non-zero weights to irrel-
evant features [6]. Thus, classifiers should first use the
highly predictive features to narrow down the set of pos-
sible output labels. These features are likely to be highly
selective and in certain domains, may be easily identifi-
able. For example, in road sign classification, knowing
the shape of the sign can be enough to uniquely iden-
tify the sign or sign class (e.g., Octagon: Stop sign; Dia-
mond: Warning sign).
In our work, we propose resilient feature engineering,
which uses highly predictive features to create adversar-
ially resilient machine learning classifiers. First, predic-
tive features for the classification task are identified. For
each identified feature, a feature extractor is constructed.
The output of each feature extractor is provided to a clas-
sification algorithm, which outputs one or more possible
class labels based on the task.
The key idea is to create these feature extractors so
they are resilient to adversarial attacks. That is to say, if
only a certain amount of input distortion is allowed, the
feature extractors cannot be adversarially attacked. We
provide two theorems, the Serial Composition Resilience
and Parallel Composition Resilience theorems, that state
if such conditions can be maintained, then the classifier
is also adversarially resilient. We discuss a basic design
for an adversarially resilient classifier based on our theo-
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
06
62
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
7 D
ec
 20
18
retical results.
2 Related Works
The existence of adversarial examples was first studied
by Szegedy et al. [22]. In their work, they found that it is
possible to arbitrarily manipulate the output of a neural
network using imperceptible, non-random perturbations
to the input, denoting these perturbed inputs as adversar-
ial examples. Since then, numerous works have appeared
proposing new algorithms for generating adversarial ex-
amples in both the digital domain [4, 11, 16, 17] and the
physical domain [3, 7–9, 14].
In an effort to mitigate the effect of adversarial ex-
amples, there is a push to design defensive measures
against adversarial examples. Research in this area can
be divided into defensive methods [11,18,21,23], which
improve a model’s resistance to adversarial examples,
and detection solutions [10, 13, 15], which use statisti-
cal properties or other information to identify adversarial
examples from natural examples.
The main issue with many of the proposed strategies
is that many of them do not provide provable security
guarantees assuming a certain threat model. Rather, they
implement a technique, such as gradient masking, PCA
analysis, or input normalization, and show that in testing
the proposed strategy is resistant to many adversarial at-
tacks. However, when exposed to an adaptive adversary
that modifies the attack based on the defense, the defense
fails [1, 2, 4, 5].
Of interest is research that provides provable security
guarantees against adversarial attacks. Hein and An-
driushchenko provided the first formal guarantees on the
adversarial robustness of a classifier [12]. More specifi-
cally, given a specific instance, they demonstrate a lower-
bound on the l2 norm of the input manipulation required
to change the output of the classifier. Similarly, Raghu-
nathan et al. also establish lower bounds on adversarial
perturbations, but do so for the l∞ norm [19].
Concurrently, Wong and Kolter also provide an adver-
sarial robust training methodology for arbitrarily deep
ReLU networks given a certain norm-bound on adver-
sarial perturbations [25]. In their work, they establish
a convex space around each input and ensure that the
classification decision for correctly labelled inputs does
not change within the space. Then, optimize the convex
space on the training point with the highest training loss.
Finally, Sinha et al. also provide methods to guarantee
adversarial robustness, but their method uses defined dis-
tributional Wasserstein distances rather than the norm of
the adversarial perturbations [20].
Compared to previous work, our work provides a
more general methodology for generating adversarially
resilient classifiers. Our approach transforms the prob-
lem of defending against adversarial attacks into design-
ing resilient feature extractors. Furthermore, we can
leverage previous results from other works to inform the
design of resilient feature extractors, rather than attempt-
ing to apply the results of those works to an entire clas-
sifier.
3 Formal Background Definitions
In this section, we formally define classifiers and adver-
sarial inputs as well as some terms related to them. These
definitions are necessary before discussing resilient fea-
ture engineering.
3.1 Classifiers
Informally, a classifier is given a set of inputs and gen-
erates a set of outputs. Each output represents the class
label for a given input where the class label belongs to a
set of class labels. For example, a image classifier may
be provided a picture of an animal and is expected to out-
put the type of animal that is in the picture.
We define x, the input to a classifier, as a set of obser-
vations. An observation is a categorical, ordinal, integer
valued, or real valued property. We define y, the output
of a classifier, as a label or category belonging to a set
of labels Y . Typically, y is a single value, but it may be a
tuple.
With these two preliminary definitions, we say that a
classifier F is a function that maps a set of observations
x to a label y in the set of labels Y . That is to say:
F(x) = y
In order to determine the correctness of a classifier,
there must be some source that generates the correct la-
bel for a given input. Given a classifier F , OF denotes
the oracle function for the classifier F . For an input x,
OF(x) = l where l ∈ Y ∪ non. non is a label that is not
contained in Y . If OF(x) = non, then we say that x is
a nonsense input. If OF(x) 6= non, then l ∈ Y and we
say that x is a natural input and is part of the natural
domain of F , denoted by NF .
A nonsense input is an input in which no label in Y
would be appropriate. That is to say, the input is not
suitable for the classification task. For example, if we
treat a human labeller as the oracle, if given a picture of
a dog and asked to label it as “stop sign” or “cup”, the
human labeller would be unable to make a correct deci-
sion. None of the labels in the label set can be reasonably
associated with the input.
For natural inputs, the output of the oracle for a given
x is referred to as the true label of x.
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With the formal definition of an oracle, we can now
verify the correctness of a classifier. Given an input
x ∈ NF , F(x) is correct if and only if F(x) = OF(x).
Otherwise, F is incorrect. If ∀x ∈ NF ,F(x) = OF(X),
then we say that F is perfectly accurate.
We will denote the space of inputs correctly labelled
by F as CF and the space of inputs incorrectly labelled
by F as IF . Therefore, NF =CF ∪ IF .
3.2 Adversarial Inputs
Informally, an adversarial input to a classifier is an in-
put that is maliciously designed to be mislabeled by the
classifier, but would be obvious for a human to label cor-
rectly. Furthermore, adversarial inputs typically appear
almost identical to a correctly labelled input.
For a classifier F , we say that an input x ∈ IF is λ -
adversarial if ∃γ : |γ| ≤ λ and F(x + γ) = OF(x + γ)
and OF(x+ γ) = OF(x). Given a λ , we denote the space
of λ -adversarial inputs for F as AλF .
In current literature, γ is a measure of distortion,
based on some measure of distance between two inputs.
We use the addition operator (e.g., x+ γ), to represents
changes made to an input x by some amount of distor-
tion γ . λ is an upper bound on the distortion allowed
when creating an adversarial input. It is typically small
so adversarial inputs appear similar to correctly labelled
inputs. For example, if the input is an image, the γ would
be a vector of positive and negative pixel value modifi-
cations. A common choice for measuring |γ| for image
inputs is computing the Lp norm of γ .
Given a classifier F , we that F is λ -resilient if and
only if AλF = /0. Furthermore, if for all λ > 0,A
λ
F = /0,
then we say that F is perfectly resilient. That is to say,
there are no adversarial examples for F .
4 Resilient Feature Engineering
In this section, we present the two main theorems, which
formally support resilient feature engineering. After
which, we introduce resilient feature engineering and
discuss the implications and use of the theorems.
4.1 Composition Resilience Theorems
We now present the Serial Composition Resilience and
Parallel Composition Resilience theorems. The proof for
both theorems can be found in the appendix. The Serial
Composition Resilience theorem is as follows:
Theorem 1. If a classifier function F(·) is λ -resilient
for some λ , then classifier function defined as G(F(·)) is
also λ -resilient.
The Serial Composition Resilience theorem demon-
strates that one can use the output of a resilient classifier
function as the input to another classifier function result-
ing in an equally resilient classifier function. Note that
although we use the term “classifier”, our definition of
classifier function allows use to extend these results to
other functional constructs. A feature extractor, for ex-
ample, is a classifier function by definition. It takes in an
input and produces an output belonging to a set of feature
labels.
The Parallel Composition Resilience theorem is as fol-
lows:
Theorem 2. If there are multiple classifiers
F1(·),F2(·)...Fn(·) which are all λ -resilient for some λ ,
then the composition G(< F1(·),F2(·)...Fn(·) >) is also
λ -resilient.
The Parallel Composition Resilience theorem demon-
strates that one can use the output of multiple resilient
classifier functions as the input to another classifier func-
tion resulting in an equally resilient classifier function.
This theorem extends the results of the Serial Composi-
tion Resilience theorem allowing us to join multiple re-
silient feature extractors as part of the classification deci-
sion. Often, using multiple feature can increase the selec-
tivity for classification. For example, suppose F extracts
the dominant sign color and G maps the color to set of
road sign containing the color. Given the color “red”,
G could output {Stop sign, Do Not Enter sign}, which
are both road signs that are predominantly red. However,
adding a shape extractor would allow one to differentiate
between a Stop sign and a Do Not Enter sign.
These two theorems allow us to simplify the task of
creating an adversarially resilient classifier into building
adversarially resilient feature extractors. The model de-
signer would first identify predictive features for the clas-
sification task either using pre-existing domain knowl-
edge or through some automatic discovery process. The
difficulty remains in designing the feature extractors may
be an easier task. If enough features are used, it may be
possible to uniquely label every possible input.
4.2 Basic Design
Resilient feature engineering is composed of the follow-
ing steps:
1. Identify a feature for the classification task
2. Create a λ -resilient feature extractor for the identi-
fied feature
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until no new features are iden-
tified or the selectivity given by the features does
not increase
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Figure 1: The basic implementation of a resilient classi-
fier built using resilient feature engineering. The output
is a vector of 0’s or 1’s with dimensions equal to the num-
ber of possible output classes. A 1 in index i means that
class label i is a possible label for the input based on the
extracted features.
4. Provide the output of the feature extractors as an
input to a classifier, which maps the features to the
label set for the classification task
In this paper, we assume feature identification is based
on pre-existing domain knowledge. Each identified fea-
ture should result in an increase in selectivity for the final
classifier. Otherwise, the feature is redundant. The basic
model architecture implied by the two theorems is shown
in Figure 1.
First, the input x is processed by each of the λ -resilient
feature extractors. Then, the set of extracted features for
that input is provided to a different classifier G, which
outputs a vector containing one or more non-zero values.
If the extracted features are sufficient to uniquely identify
the label for x, then only one non-zero value is present.
Otherwise, multiple non-zero values may be present indi-
cate multiple possible output labels due to shared feature
sets between labels. The weighting of the non-zero val-
ues in the final output vector is a design decision. In Fig-
ure 1, we assume equal weighting, but it could be based
on some contextual information. Using unequal weight-
ing may be desirable, especially if the output vector is
intended to be used in a future computation.
We will use a basic traffic sign classification task to
illustrate how the basic implementation works. Suppose,
there are two resilient feature extractors, F1 and F2, that
extract the dominant color and shape of a sign in the input
respectively. G can be any classification algorithm, but
for simplicity we will assume it is a decision tree with the
possible output vector values pre-determined based on
existing domain knowledge. Furthermore, we will limit
the possible output labels to the following list of U.S.
stop signs1:
• Regulatory: Stop, Yield, Do Not Enter
• Warning: Left Turn Ahead, Right Turn Ahead
• Pedestrian: No Pedestrians
• Other: Speed Limit 25, Speed Limit 45, Hospital
Therefore, the output vector has 9 indices with the
labels ordered based on the above list. We denote the
combined classifiers F and G as R for convenience.
Now, consider the following input signs: Stop, Left
Turn Ahead, Hospital. The resilient classifiers F1 and
F2 would have the following outputs:
• Stop: F1(x) = Red, F2(x) = Octagon
• Left Turn Ahead: F1(x) = Yellow, F2(x) = Dia-
mond
• Hospital: F1(x) = Blue, F2(x) = Square
and the output of G based on the extracted features
would be:
• Stop: G(x) =< 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 >
• Left Turn Ahead: G(x) =< 0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0 >
• Hospital: G(x) =< 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 >
For the Stop sign, knowing that the sign is red is insuf-
ficient to uniquely label the sign given the set of possible
labels. Both Yield and Do Not Enter signs are also red.
However, knowing the shape of the sign is sufficient to
identify the sign as a Stop. We see a similar result for the
Hospital sign. The shape of the sign isn’t sufficient be-
cause a No Pedestrian sign is also a square, but the color,
blue, uniquely identifies the sign based on the limited la-
bel set.
For the Left Turn Ahead sign, the output vector con-
tains multiple non-zero indices because the extracted fea-
tures belong to two possible signs. Left Turn Ahead
and Right Turn Ahead are both “yellow” and “diamond”.
Therefore, the extracted features indicate the output is
either of these two sign labels, but cannot specify fur-
ther. Although this may seem like a limitation, consider
the implementation shown in Figure 2. The label vec-
tor would only allow for adversarial attacks that between
classes that share the same set of extracted features. In
this example, it is not possible to cause the classifier to
label a Stop sign as a Left turn Ahead sign and vice versa.
1The designation and appearance of the signs can be found at
https://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/services/publications/
fhwaop02084/
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Figure 2: Augmenting an existing classifier V with the
robust classifier. The softmax output of V is multiplied
with the vector of possible class labels generated by the
robust classifier R. The result is re-normalized to obtain
a new softmax output.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce resilient feature engineering
as a methodology for designing adversarially resilient
classifiers. Our methodology is supported by the Serial
Composition and Parallel Composition theorems, which
allow for the chaining of resilient functions to create an
adversarially resilient classifier. We also discussed a ba-
sic implementation of an adversarially resilient classifier.
However, we leave several open problems for future
work. The first problem is identifying predictive features
to extract. In this paper, we discussed using pre-existing
domain knowledge to identity features useful for classifi-
cation, but such easily identifiable features are often not
present. In other machine learning applications, such as
medical imaging or speech recognition, it may be unclear
what features are useful. However, work on improving
the explainability of learned features as well as determin-
ing their relevance to the final prediction may be useful
towards feature identification.
A second problem is the feasibility of designing adver-
sarially resilient classifiers. For simpler features, such as
color, it may be sufficient to compute the most common
color in the input. However, more complex feature such
as shape may require more powerful algorithms such as
deep neural networks, due to timing constraints or fea-
ture complexity. For this, we turn to the existing work
in provable adversarial security. Although the existing
research focuses providing resilience guarantees for a
general classifier, subdividing the classifier into a set of
smaller feature extractors may result in more efficient or
stronger resilience guarantees.
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A Formal Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose we have two label sets denoted as Y and Z, such
that Y ∩ Z = /0. That is to say, they do not share any
labels. Despite this, let us assume it is possible to map
some or all of the labels in Z to labels in Y . We will define
this mapping function as the oracle OL of the classifier L
where L(z) = y. We define two classifiers F and G as
such:
• F(x) = y ∈ Y
• G(y) = z ∈ Z
where F is λ -resilient. Using F and G, we also use a
classifier R to denote the composition G(F(x)) :
• R(x) = G(F(x)) = z ∈ Z
• OR(x) = OG(OF(x)) = l ∈ Z
Note that the mapping function OL is the inverse function
for OG since both are oracle functions and thus always
produce the correct result.
Using these definitions, we restate the Serial Compo-
sition Resilience theorem:
Theorem. For arbitrary z1,z2 ∈ Z, if OL(z1) = y1,
OL(z2) = y2, y1 6= y2, and R(x) = z1, then there is no
α < λ and |γ| < α such that R(x+ γ) = z2 and OR(x+
γ) = OR(x) = z2
We will verify this theorem using a proof by contra-
diction and show that assuming the opposite of the impli-
cation will result in a contradiction with the assumption
that F is perfectly resilient.
∃α < λ ,0 < |γ|< α : Assume
R(x+ γ) = z2 and
OR(x) = OR(x+ γ) = z2
G(F(x+ γ)) = z2 Def of R
R(x) = z1 Given
G(F(x)) = z1 Def of R
z1 6= z2 OL is a function
G(F(x)) 6= G(F(x+ γ)) Substitution
F(x) 6= F(x+ γ) G is a function
With this, we have show that the initial assumption
has resulted in F(x) 6= F(x+ γ). To complete the proof,
we need to demonstrate that F(x+ γ) = OF(x+ γ). In
doing so, it would mean that x is an adversarial example
in AαF and since α < λ , F would not be λ -resilient by
definition.
∃α < λ ,0 < |γ|< α : Assume
R(x+ γ) = z2 and
OR(x) = OR(x+ γ) = z2
OL(z2) = y2 Given
OG(OF(x)) = z2 Def of OR
OL(OG(OF(x))) = OL(z2)
= OF(x) = y2 OL is the inverse of OG
OG(OF(x+ γ)) = z2 Def of OR
OL(OG(OF(x+ γ))) = OL(z2)
= OF(x+ γ) = y2 OL is the inverse of OG
At this point, we’ve show that the true label for x and
x+ γ based on the label set Y is y2. What remains for the
proof is to establish that F outputs a label for x that is
incorrect.
R(x+ γ) = z2 Given
G(F(x+ γ)) = z2 Def of R
G(F(x+ γ)) = OG(OF(x+ γ)) Substitution
F(x+ γ) = OF(x+ γ) Apply OL
F(x) 6= F(x+ γ) Established previously
F(x) 6= OF(x) Substitution
x ∈ IF Def of IF
x ∈ AλF Def of AαF
F is not λ -resilient Def of λ -resilient
However, it was given that F is perfectly resilient.
Therefore, Theorem 1 is true through proof by contra-
diction.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose we have n+ 1 label sets denoted Y1,Y2...,Yn,Z
such that Y1 ∩Y2...∩Yn ∩ Z = /0. We define the map-
ping function as the oracle OL of the classifier L where
L(z) =< y1,y2...,yn >. yi denotes a label in the label set
Yi.
We define have n+1 classifiers such that:
• F1(x) = y1 ∈ Y1...,Fn(x) = yn ∈ Yn
• G(< y1,y2...,yn >) = z ∈ Z
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where each Fi for i = 1...n is λ -resilient. Note that OL is
the inverse function of OG.
Using these classifiers, we use R to denote the compo-
sition of G and each Fi:
• R(x) = G(F1(x),F2(x)...,Fn(x)) = z ∈ Z
• OR(x) = OG(OF1(x),OF2(x)...,OFn(x)) = l ∈ Z
Using these definitions, we restate the Parallel Com-
position resilience theorem:
Theorem. For arbitrary z1,z2 ∈ Z, if OL(z1) = C1,
OL(z2) = C2, C1 6= C2, and R(x) = z1, then there is
no α < λ and |γ| < α such that R(x + γ) = z2 and
OR(x+ γ) = OR(x) = z2
For clarification, C1,C2 are n-tuples and elements of
the set Y1xY2...xYn. We will verify this theorem using a
proof by contradiction and show that assuming the op-
posite of the implication will result in a contradiction
with the assumption that every classifier F is perfectly
resilient.
∃α < λ ,0 < |γ|< α : Assume
R(x+ γ) = z2 and
OR(x) = OR(x+ γ) = z2
Let S2 =< F1(x+ γ)...,Fn(x+ γ)> Let
G(S2) = z2 Def of R
R(x) = z1 Given
Let S1 =< F1(x)...,Fn(x)> Let
G(S1) = z1 Def of R
z1 6= z2 Given
G(S1) 6= G(S2) Substitution
S1 6= S2 G is a function
∃i for 1≤ i≤ n : Equality of n-tuples
Fi(x) 6= Fi(x+ γ)
With this, we have show that the initial assumption has
resulted in Fi(x) 6= Fi(x+ γ) for some i between 1 and n.
We now move to show that x∈ IFi and x+γ ∈CFi for that
i.
∃α < λ ,0 < |γ|< α : Assume
R(x+ γ) = z2 and
OR(x) = OR(x+ γ) = z2
OL(z2) =C2 Given
Let T1 =< OF1(x)...,OFn(x)> Let
OG(T1) = z2 Def of OR
OL(OG(T1)) = OL(z2)
= T1 =C2 OL is the inverse of OG
Let T2 =< OF1(x+ γ)...,OFn(x+ γ)> Let
OG(T2)) = z2 Def of OR
OL(OG(T2)) = OL(z2)
= T2 =C2 OL is the inverse of OG
Let ciz denote the ith element of Cz Let
OFi(x) = OFi(x+ γ) = c
i
2 Equality of n-tuples
Remember that i is the index for the classifier function
that is not λ -resilient. At this point, we’ve show that the
true label for x and x+ γ based on the label set Yi is ci2.
What remains for the proof is to establish that Fi outputs
a label for x that is incorrect.
R(x+ γ) = z2 Given
G(S2) = z2 Def of R and S2
G(S2) = OG(T2) Substitution
S2 = T2 Apply OL
Fi(x+ γ) = OFi(x+ γ) Apply OL
Fi(x) 6= Fi(x+ γ) Established previously
Fi(x) 6= OFi(x) Substitution
x ∈ IFi Def of IFi
x ∈ AαFi Def of AαFi
Fi is not λ -resilient Def of λ -resilient
However, it was given that for i = 1...n,Fi is λ -
resilient. Therefore, Theorem 2 is true through proof by
contradiction.
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